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CONTENT AND CONTEXT: THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE
TO FIRST AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION
RODNEY A. SMOLLA†
INTRODUCTION
William Van Alstyne’s contributions to First Amendment
interpretation, like his contributions to all of American constitutional
law, are characterized by a piercing intellectual honesty and an impish
play of intelligence. One feels relentlessly pulled by the elegant
currents of Professor Van Alsytne ’s arguments, yet, at the same time,
restlessly resistant, a resistance borne of the vague but certain
wariness that one is but an apprentice forever consigned to a level of
awareness several moves behind the master, who almost certainly will
produce surprises at the end.
In this essay I explore two defining themes of Professor Van
Alsytne’s First Amendment thought, themes that occupy cornerstone
placements in the modern architecture of First Amendment law. The
first theme deals with the core content of the First Amendment’s
Speech Clause.1 The second theme deals with the vexing problem of
how to interpret the Speech Clause in the context of the
government’s putative participation in the expressive enterprise.
In the parlance of Professor Van Alsytne’s scholarship, Part I of
this essay searches for the meaning of the First Amendment’s phrase
“the freedom of speech,” with an emphasis on “the.”2 This
exploration includes an examination of the shortcomings of
“absolutism” as a plausible understanding of the meaning of “the
Copyright © 2005 by Rodney A. Smolla
† Dean and George E. Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams
School of Law. J.D., 1978, Duke University School of Law; student in Professor Van Alstyne’s
courses in constitutional law.
1. See U.S. CONST . amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the fre edom of
speech . . . .”).
2. WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25 (1984).
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freedom of speech,”3 an examination of why the history surrounding
the enactment of the First Amendment, including the elusive search
for the “original understanding” of the First Amendment, is only of
limited utility in supplying doctrinal content to the Free Speech
Clause.4 Part I concludes with a critique of the various attempts that
have been made to reduce the meaning of the Free Speech Clause to
some formulaic calculation. These calculations include the “bad
tendency” test;5 the “clear and present danger” test;6 Judge Learned
Hand’s risk calculation test, embraced for a time by the Supreme
Court in Dennis v. United States;7 and the currently prevailing
orthodoxy, the “incitement test” articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio,8
as well as various “categorical” approaches to free speech law, such as
that suggested by the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.9

3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. The “bad tendency” test is most famously
associated with the early free speech opinions of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, before Holmes
shifted to positions more protective of freedom of speech. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211, 216 (1919) (“[T]he jury were [sic] most carefully instructed that they could not find the
defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words used had as their natural
tendency . . . to obstruct the recruiting service . . . .”); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204,
209 (1919) (concluding that a speaker may be punished for knowingly making statements that
tend to “kindle a flame” of dissent in the audience); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (“If the act, . . . its tendency[,] and the intent with which it is done are the same, we
perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.”). Under this
test, the mere “tendency” of speech to cause harm was enough to justify its regulation. Ernst
Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 40 U. CHI. L. R EV. 239, 239 (1973); David M.
Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 533 (1981).
6. See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
7. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger.” Id. at 510 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212
(2d Cir. 1950)); see infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. Professor Van Alstyne critiques
the Hand / Dennis formula in Interpretations of the First Amendment. VAN ALSTYNE, supra
note 2, at 30–37.
8. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447; see infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. Professor Van Alstyne discusses the
Brandenburg formula in Interpretations of the First Amendment. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2,
at 35.
9. 315 U.S. 568 (1942); id. at 571–72 (discussing forms of speech that do not receive First
Amendment protection); see infra notes 86–112 and accompanying text.
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Modern free speech doctrine takes in a vast landscape. The table
of contents of Professor Van Alstyne’s law school casebook on the
First Amendment illustrates the point.10 The topics covered by the
casebook include taxation of the press, regulation of the political
process, campaign finance laws, libel law, privacy law, symbolic
dissent, prior restraints, regulation of speech in relation to the judicial
process, the speech of government employees, public forum law,
regulation of broadcasting, coerced expression, anonymity and
freedom of expression, commercial speech, press access to judicial
proceedings, and obscenity11 —and these topics, numerous as they are,
do not include all that exist (lest the casebook become so thick as to
lose its pedagogical utility and market viability).
Tests such as “clear and present danger” or the Brandenburg
incitement standard may be perfectly serviceable when dealing with a
prosecution for incitement to riot, but they tend to lose their
coherence when applied to such issues as libel, public forum law, or
campaign finance restrictions. In modern First Amendment doctrine,
one size does not fit all, at least not stylishly. As Professor Van
Alstyne’s scholarly efforts have so well de monstrated, the intelligent
design of free speech doctrine must be a constant work-in-progress,
continually refined to remain robustly protective of free speech.
Part I of this essay examines Professor Van Alsytne ’s wonderful
insights into the intricacies of any conscientious attempt to define the
appropriate core content of “the freedom of speech,” with particular
emphasis on the strengths and weaknesses of such approaches as
absolutism, historicism, and formulaic standards. Part I examines
Professor Van Alsytne’s important contributions to the ongoing
constitutional conversation on the meaning of the First Amendment,
and offers in turn a few modest ruminations on that conversation.
In Part II, I explore a second theme of Professor Van Alstyne ’s
scholarship, one that centers less on content and more on context in
First Amendment analysis. This Part focuses specifically on one of the
great perplexing questions of modern First Amendment law: To what
extent are First Amendment protections appropriately diminished or
diluted when the government itself is in some way a putative
participant in the expressive activity? I use the term “putative
participant” here purposefully —for whether the government is a
10. WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS xi–xvi (2d
ed. 1995).
11. Id.
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genuine participant is often a critical issue in contest, as is the degree
and nature of that participation.12 Indeed, a careful dissection of the
claimed participation is often warranted, with the degree of
protection derived through analysis of the precise nature of the
government’s participation.13 This problem of the “government as
participant” arises in modern First Amendment law in many different
iterations, ranging from issues posed by the regulation of speech on
government property or in a government facility (an issue usually
treated as part of “public forum” law14 ), to situations in which the
speech takes place in the context of some governmental enterprise
(such as public education, public employment, or the management of
a prison system15 ), to speech by government licensees in regulated
industries (such as the regulation of broadcasting by the Federal
Communications Commission16 ), to speech that is subsidized in whole
or in part by government funding (such as student publications at a
state university17 or funding of the arts18 ), to the direct expressive
activity of the government itself, such as an antismoking campaign
(so-called “government speech”19 ). In Part II, I explore how attempts
12. See generally id. at 330–33; see infra note 166 and accompanying text.
13. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 330–33; see infra Parts II.B & C.
14. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 480–552; see infra Part II.B.
15. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 336–420; see infra Part II.C.
16. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369, 375 (1969) (rejecting broadcasters’
First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s “fairness doctrine” requiring broadcasters to cover
both sides of public issues); VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 536–47 (discussing Red Lion and
regulation of the airwaves).
17. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825, 837 (1995)
(holding that a university policy of denying funding to any student group that “primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality” infringes
the right to free speech (alteration in original) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at
66a)).
18. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to the statutory requirement that the National Endowment for the Arts,
in assessing the artistic merit of grant applications, “tak[e] into consideration general standards
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” (alteration in
original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1))).
19. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“[V]iewpoint-based
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker.”);
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (“It is
inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies within its constitutional
powers but which nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere convictions of
some of its citizens.”); Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Michael, J., writing separately and announcing the judgment) (concluding that a license plate
bearing the slogan “Choose Life” constitutes a mixture of government and private speech), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1036 (2005); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring) (same); Sons of Confederate
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to grapple with the problems posed by the government-as-putativeparticipant in speech usually trigger forays into one of the larger
quandaries of American constitutional law, the “right-privilege”
distinction, and its doctrinal antidote, the “doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.”20 The direction of American
constitutional law on this right-privilege issue has been heavily
influenced by William Van Alstyne ’s writings.21
I. THE CORE CONTENT OF THE
SPEECH CLAUSE: THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
One of my favorite episodes in modern American libel litigation
arose from a breezy interview of the writer Mary McCarthy on the
old Dick Cavett show, in which McCarthy was slinging literary slams
against other writers, including Lillian Hellman. Among her zings was
the insult that “every word she writes is a lie, including ‘and’ and
‘the.’”22 Hellman sued McCarthy for libel and appropriately lost.23
The essential relevancy of this seemingly inessential irrelevancy,
however, is the nice illustration of the degree to which little words,
even the lowly “the,” may at times pack big importance.
A. Why the First Amendment Cannot be an Absolute
William Van Alstyne uses a combination of the “the” in the
Speech Clause and a series of what he calls “irresistible
counterexamples” to illustrate why, as a matter of both constitutional

Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that a Sons of Confederate Veterans license plate featuring a Confederate flag
constitutes private speech); see infra note 166 and accompanying text.
20. See V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 330–78 (discussing the right-privilege distinction
and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); see infra Part II.A.
21. Van Alstyne’s works on this topic include V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 330–34;
William Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. R EV. 445, 485–87 (1977) [hereinafter Van Alstyne, New
Property]; William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. R EV. 1439, 1461–62 (1968) [hereinafter Van Alstyne, RightPrivilege Distinction]; see infra Part II.A.
22. Hellman v. McCarthy, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1789, 1790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984),
discussed in R ODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 62–66 (1986).
23. SMOLLA, supra note 22, at 62–66.
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text and common logic, the First Amendment cannot be sensibly
interpreted as providing absolute protection for freedom of speech.24
The actual constitutional text, of which we ought never tire,
bears repeating: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”25 We may properly thank Professor Van
Alstyne for reminding us, at the threshold, that this command is
relatively unique among constitutional guarantees in its lack of
condition or equivocation.26 Unlike the Fourth Amendment, it is not
limited to “unreasonable ” actions by government, as in the case of the
prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”27 Similarly,
unlike the Fifth Amendment, it is not trimmed by requiring that
government provide only that “process” which is “due.”28 And unlike
the Eighth Amendment, it is not confined to punishments that are
“excessive,” “cruel,” or “unusual.”29
The command of the First Amendment is, by comparison to
other guarantees, ostensibly absolute. And there have been jurists
who have insisted on absolute fidelity to its language. Justice Black
would thus sternly invoke the First Amendment’s clarion command
that “Congress shall make no law” abridging freedom of speech as a
literal translation of a sacred text, employing a kind of First
Amendment version of scriptural fundamentalism, in which the words
“no law” were understood quite literally as no law, “without any ifs,
buts, or whereases.”30 Echoing his Brother’s theme, Justice Douglas
often concurred in similarly soaring invocations, such as his statement
in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National

24. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 22–26 (suggesting that speech such as soliciting
murder and threatening the president would not fall within the “the” in “the freedom of
speech”).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. See V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 22 (“In comparison with nearly every other
provision in the Bill of Rights, the first amendment is of exceptional crispness and clarity.”).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–49 (1976)
(employing a cost-benefit analysis to determine levels of procedural protection that apply to
deprivations of interests in “‘liberty’ or ‘property’” in context of administrative action (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV)).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
30. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Edmond Cahn,
Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 549, 559
(1952) (“My view is . . . without any ifs, buts or whereases, that freedom of speech means that
you shall not do something to people either for the views they have or the views they express or
the words they speak or write.” (remarks of Justice Black)).
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Committee31 that “[t]he ban of ‘no’ law that abridges freedom of the
press is in my view total and complete.”32
Through a parade of “irresistible counterexamples,” Professor
Van Alstyne demonstrates an intuitive recognition that many
instances of communication that fall literally within the meaning of
the word “speech” in the First Amendment cannot plausibly be
understood to dwell within the shelter of the constitutional command
protecting “the freedom of speech.”33
Professor Van Alstyne begins with the best-known of all such
counterexamples, the argument of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
that no credible conception of the meaning of the Free Speech Clause
will include within its protection the case of a person shouting “Fire!”
in a crowded theater—knowing there is no fire—for the perverse
purpose of precipitating a stampede.34 Holmes’ example is so often
quoted that it now verges on cultural cliché.35
Yet, to illustrate the convolution of modern First Amendment
law, even the irresistible counterexamples may be subjected to
irresistible counter-counterexamples. Pushing the problem in his
inimitably puckish way, for example, Van Alstyne devilishly posits
the problem of a diabolical villain who shouts “Fire!” in a crowded
theater populated entirely by persons who are deaf, watching a movie
with subtitles!36
Taking a cue from Van Alstyne ’s clever play on the Holmes
counterexample, I offer some plays of my own. In the midst of debate
over the meaning of “the freedom of speech,” someone will inevitably
declare that it does not encompass any right to shout “Fire!” in a
crowded theater. But of course, it does, if there is a fire. And of
course, the observation by Holmes does not solve many subsidiary
difficulties, such as what society’s response ought to be when the
person who shouts “Fire!” thinks there is one but turns out to be

31. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
32. Id. at 156 (Douglas, J., concurring).
33. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 22–26.
34. Id. at 24; see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater
and causing a panic.”).
35. R ODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 98–108 (1992) (explaining
the development of free speech jurisprudence, including Holmes’ “fire” quote); see Gerald
Caplan, Searching for Holmes Among the Biographers, 70 GEO. WASH. L. R EV. 769, 770–71 n.4
(2002) (commenting on the pervasiveness of Holmes’s images in federal court opinions).
36. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 38.
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mistaken. May strict liability attach to render the shouter responsible
for ensuing harm? 37 Should negligence be the operative principle?38
Or is a standard more protective of such speech warranted, something
similar to “reckless disregard” for the risks of harm?39 And recalling
that when Holmes made this observation he was putting it to the
service of a discussion of liability for antiwar protest and draft
obstruction, the metaphor of “fire” and “crowded theater” also
invites judgment as to whether expression of opinion may be
penalized.40 If the shout of “fire” is an argument that launching a war

37. One might, for example, treat the shouting of “Fire!” in a crowded theater as a kind of
intramural exercise of speech not part of the arena of public discourse implicating any issue of
public concern, and thus essentially beneath the radar of the First Amendment. See Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–60 (1985) (raising the possibility
that common-law strict liability standards for defamation may be constitutionally permissible
when the attempt to impose liability does not involve any issue of “public concern”). There is
authority for the proposition that the First Amendment might permit strict liability standards to
apply in defamation actions not involving public figure plaintiffs or issues of public concern.
Sleem v. Yale Univ., 843 F. Supp. 57, 62 (M.D.N.C. 1993); Ross v. Bricker, 770 F. Supp. 1038,
1043 (D.V.I. 1991); Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1505 n.21 (D.D.C.
1987); R ODNEY A. SMOLLA , THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3:17 (2d ed. 2004); see also Snead v.
Redland Aggregates, Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that Dun & Bradstreet
exempts states from First Amendment strictures in defamation actions when speech does not
relate to matters of public concern); Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 775 F.2d 593, 594–95 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding that under Dun & Bradstreet no First Amendment principles attached to speech
arising from an interoffice memorandum not related to issues of public concern).
38. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that ordinary
negligence is the minimum First Amendment standard required of states for the imposition of
liability in defamation cases in which the plaintiff is a private figure).
39. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (establishing standard
of “knowledge that [a statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether [a statement]
was false or not” in public official defamation cases).
40. Separating “fact” from “opinion,” and determining the extent to which the First
Amendment ought to be understood as speaking to this issue, has been a vexing issue. The
question has had a rollercoaster history, for example, in First Amendment cases dealing with
defamation standards. The starting point for analysis si the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in its landmark decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
Prior to Milkovich, there was a spreading consensus among lower courts that the First
Amendment contained a freestanding constitutional protection for statements of opinion in
defamation actions. This constitutional protection of opinion was seen as superseding and
augmenting the protections embodied in the “fair comment” privilege recognized at common
law. The basis of this belie f was traced most famously to language in Gertz , in which the
Supreme Court stated with seemingly emphatic certitude that “[u]nder the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pe rnicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”
418 U.S. at 339–40. Building on this pronouncement in Gertz, as well as other statements from
the Supreme Court protecting “rhetorical hyperbole,” Greenbelt Coop. Publ. Assoc. v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970), “lusty and imaginative expression of contempt,” Old Dominion Branch
No. 496, Nat’l Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974), or vicious parody,
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against Iraq in the absence of transparent and public documentation
of weapons of mass destruction, and the “crowded theater” is
something akin to the “theater of war against terrorism,” then
whether there is a “fire” and a “war” in the constitutional sense may
both be matters of contingent characterization on which reasonable
and loyal citizens are permitted to disagree.41
Professor Van Alstyne poses many other irresistible
counterexamples, all of which reinforce his general premise—that
each counterexample is “an instance of speech plainly within the
literal protection of the first amendment but an instance nonetheless
sufficient to give one pause.”42 For each such irresistible
counterexample posited by Professor Van Alstyne, one might cite
examples recognized by the courts confirming the common sense
“pause” indicating that the First Amendment simply cannot be
understood as absolute. This overlap of Professor Van Alstyne’s
counterexamples and judicial decisions limiting free speech include
solicitation of murder,43 bribery of a public official,44 false and

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988), lower courts not only treated opinion as
independently protected by the First Amendment, but constructed various multi-part doctrinal
tests to define “opinion” generously. These judicial decisions tended to emphasize such factors
as (1) the author’s choice of words, (2) whether the cha llenged statement is capable of being
objectively characterized as true or false, (3) the context of the challenged statement within the
writing or speech as a whole, and (4) the broader social context into which the statement fits.
See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (emphasizing these four
factors). The Supreme Court’s decision in Milkovich, however, complicated this picture. In
Milkovich the Court held that there is no freestanding First Amendment privilege protecting
“opinion” in defamation suits. 497 U.S. at 19–20. Yet at the same time, the Supreme Court in
Milkovich held that in defamation suits against media defendants involving stories on issues on
“matters of public concern,” the First Amendment requires that the defamatory statement,
whether express or implied, be provable as false before there can be liability. See id. at 20 (“The
question is not whether a statement is an opinion, but whether a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the statement implies an assertion of fact that is provable as false.”).
41. See Rodney A. Smolla, Not So Free Speech, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 62–66
(reviewing GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005)).
42. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 24.
43. Id. at 24; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting):
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify punishing
persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may punish speech that
produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring
about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may
seek to prevent.
For another case discussing free speech and solicitation of murder, see Rice v. Paladin
Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the First Amendment does not
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misleading commercial advertising,45 perjury,46 disruption of public
meetings by interrupting the speech of someone else who has already
been granted the floor,47 and a threat against the life of the
president.48
Absolutism has thus failed to carry the day, largely because it is
simply too brittle to account for the many “irresistible
counterexamples” for which some accounting must be made. A
simplistic and entirely unsatisfying accommodation, advanced by
Justice Black, was to label with the conclusory epithet “conduct” any
form of expression that Justice Black deemed unworthy. This
bar imposition of liability against publisher of a murder instruction manual when the manual
was used by a professional hit man to perform contract murder for hire).
44. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 24; see also FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001) (assuming the constitutionality of antibribery laws); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (recognizing the government’s interest in preventing “quid pro
quo” donations).
45. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 24–25. Contemporary commercial speech doctrine is
governed by the four-part test first articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980):
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governme ntal interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
A large and contentious body of law has arisen regarding the nature of the proof required to
satisfy the threshold Central Hudson requirement that the speech not be “misleading.” The
issue was presented by Nike, Inc. v. Kasky , 539 U.S. 654 (2003), in which the Supreme Court
ultimately refused to consider what First Amendment standards ought to apply to allegedly
misleading statements by the corporate giant Nike regarding its employment practices in thirdworld nations, see id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring). The California Supreme Court had
sustained liability against Nike. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262 (Cal. 2002). The Supreme
Court granted review, to great fanfare, only to dismiss the writ of certiorari as “improvidently
granted.” Nike, 539 U.S. at 655.
46. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 25; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S.
36, 49 n.10 (1961) (explicitly rejecting the absolutist view of the meaning of the First
Amendment and observing that such a view “of course cannot be reconciled with the law
relating to libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation of
crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and the like.”).
47. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 25; see also State v. Hardin, 498 N.W.2d 677, 681 (Iowa
1993) (holding that the First Amendment did not give a person a right to disrupt President Bush
at a political fundraiser).
48. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 25; see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003)
(exploring the meaning of the “true threat” doctrine under the First Amendment in the context
of a challenge to Virginia’s anti-cross-burning statute); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969) (exploring the meaning of the “true threat” doctrine in the context of prosecution under
federal law criminalizing threats against the president, in a case in which the ostensible threat
was deemed mere political hyperbole).
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expression could include activity that is undeniably expressive and
also undeniably political, and thus (one might expect) at least
presumptively protected. Justice Black thus dissented, voting against
providing First Amendment protection for the expression, in the
famous “Fuck the Draft” case, Cohen v. California,49 explaining that
in wearing his offending jacket as a protest against the War in
Vietnam, Paul Cohen was engaged, not in speech, but in conduct.50
Yet Mr. Cohen’s message was manifestly metaphorical, as one cannot
literally perform a sexual act with a federal agency. Similarly, in
Adderley v. Florida ,51 Justice Black voted against First Amendment
protection for civil rights protestors picketing outside a courthouse,
again reasoning that the law was restricting conduct, not speech.52 In
both cases Justice Black was dealing with protest that heavily relied
upon the symbolic use of expression. Although it may well be that
when expressive activity is brigaded with action or intertwined with
physical conduct the government may have especially cogent claims
for regulating certain aspects of the activity for reasons unrelated to
the suppression of ideas or the content of the communication,53 the
mere surface labeling of speech that has been deemed undesirable as
conduct cannot be enough to take the government off the hook.
B. Why History is not a Reliable Guide
When absolutes fail, history is a tempting substitute. Interpreting
a clause in the Constitution’s text in light of the original
understanding of the clause may indeed supply a tempting certitude
and legitimacy. Professor Van Alstyne, however, has not attempted to
ground his approach to First Amendment interpretation in the
original understanding of the Framers, and for good reason. The
restricting reality of the First Amendment (and of numerous other
grandly phrased clauses in the Constitution) is that history does not
easily yield its secrets.

49. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
50. Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relying on the speech/conduct distinction in a
dissenting opinion joined by Justice Black).
51. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
52. Id. at 42.
53. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding an anti-noise
regulation); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 372 (1968) (upholding a ban on burning
draft cards because of the government’s interest in preserving an administrative system).
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As a matter of surface impression, what history seems to make of
the First Amendment is that the Amendment did not mean much.
The text of the Constitution refers only to “Congress,” and
commands merely that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.” Grammar would thus both permit and arguably
invite the understanding that the First Amendment, by targeting only
Congress, was applicable only to abridgements of a uniquely federal
character, or, at the very most, limited to the common-law prohibition
against prior restraints.54 In one of his earliest iterations of the
meaning of the First Amendment, for example, Justice Holmes held
in Patterson v. Colorado55 that a newspaper publisher could be jailed
for contempt for daring to criticize the Colorado Supreme Court.56
Throughout Holmes’ ruling in Patterson, Holmes casts doubt on the
notion that the First Amendment applied to acts of state government
at all.57 Even if the First Amendment did apply to Colorado, on the
supposition that some notion of “freedom of speech” was implicit in
the conceptions of liberty recited in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Holmes suggested that the meaning of the
First Amendment was limited to the prevention of prior restraint.58
Holmes would come to abandon this narrow view, and indeed, to
abandon any effort to ground his First Amendment thought in
history.59 Following Holmes, the development of modern First
Amendment law has been largely ahistorical. The principal difficulty
54. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52 (“The liberty of the press . . .
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication . . . .”).
55. 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
56. See id. at 462 (holding that the First Amendment’s main purpose is to shield against
prior restraints).
57. See id. at 460 (suggesting that the “Fourteenth Amendment would not forbid” certain
intrusions by states into federal constitutional rights).
58. See id. at 462:
But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and freedom of the press were
protected from abridgments on the part not only of the United States but also of the
States, still we should be far from the conclusion that the plaintiff in error would have
us reach. In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is “to
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other
governments,” and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be
deemed contrary to the public welfare. The preliminary freedom extends as well to
the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as
to the false. This was the law of criminal libel apart from statute in most cases, if not
in all.
(footnotes omitted).
59. See Rabban, supra note 5, at 591 (stating that Holmes, along with Brandeis, departed
from historical interpretations of the First Amendment and developed a theory of the
Amendment based on the writings of Zechariah Chafee, Jr.).
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with any effort to liquidate the meaning of the First Amendment
through reference to the original understanding of the Framers is
that, among those select Framers who thought about the matter at all,
different Framers thought different things.60 James Wilson articulated
the meaning of the Amendment in Blackstonian terms, observing that
“what is meant by the liberty of the press is, that there should be no
antecedent restraint upon it; but that every author is responsible
when he attacks the security or welfare of the government or the
safety, character and property of the individual.”61 James Madison,
however, explained the First Amendment by contrasting its
protection with the British tradition,62 and would come to refer to
freedom of the press as among the “essential” “rights of Conscience
in the fullest latitude.”63
Crabbed historicism also suffers from any lack of sensitivity to
the larger arc of history that defined the American Revolution. The
single most important historical datum regarding the Revolution is
that it was a revolution, in which conceptions of government were in
the process of radical and wholesale modification.64 The rebellious
assumptions of the new nation were that ultimate sovereignty rested
with the people, that legitimacy was dependent on the consent of the
governed, and that expa nsive conceptions of liberty were
fundamental to the nature of men. The Framers lived and breathed
freedom of speech, and, in choosing such ringing and unqualified
phrasing, it is doubtful that they intended future generations to be
bound by any narrow English conceptions of what “the freedom of
speech” should come to mean.
C. The Formulas and Graphics of First Amendment Protection
Professor Van Alstyne, like Holmes before him, thus wisely
eschews absolutes, as well as any strong reliance on history as a guide

60. See David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of
Expression in Early American History , 37 STAN. L. R EV. 795, 816–20 (1985) (reviewing
LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985)) (discussing the divergent views of the
Framers regarding free speech).
61. See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI -FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 97 n.6 (1981).
62. See James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 1798, in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES
528 (2d ed. 1941) (decrying the Alien and Sedition Acts as akin to monarchy).
63. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 320 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
64. See Rabban, supra note 60, at 855 (“[A] new conception of popular sovereignty,
derived from the Radical Whig tradition in England, arose during the American
Revolution . . . .”).
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to interpreting the First Amendment. But if absolutes won’t do, and
history cannot help, what principles ought to guide First Amendment
jurisprudence? Rather than manufacture an elegant theory of First
Amendment interpretation out of philosophical whole cloth,
Professor Van Alstyne, following the method characteristic of all his
constitutional scholarship, instead takes up the classic tools of the
trade, and from them constructs his model.65 Professor Van Alstyne
closely examines the cases, and the various doctrinal formulas and
animating principles that emerge from them, relentlessly critiquing,
contrasting, and comparing. Among my favorite examples of
Professor Van Alstyne ’s labors in this regard is his essay “A Graphic
Review of the Free Speech Clause.”66 Using diagrams and charts to
illustrate graphically how various doctrinal approaches to First
Amendment law operate, Professor Van Alstyne steadily and
inexorably builds toward the extraction of guiding maxims for hardy
and robust constitutional protection for speech. Professor Van
Alstyne’s graphic tour of the First Amendment invites a survey of
such nominees as the “bad tendency” test; “clear and present
danger”; the Hand / Dennis test; and the modern variation of “clear
and present danger,” the Brandenburg incitement test, as well as
“categorical” approaches to First Amendment interpretation.67
1. Bad Tendency. Modern free speech law started with a false
start. In Schenck v. United States,68 Holmes announced his famous
“clear and present danger” test,69 language that appeared to
contemplate strong protection for freedom of speech. But the “clear
and present danger” test in Schenck proved to be less than met the

65. See generally Garrett Epps, “You Have Been in Afghanistan”: A Discourse on the Van
Alstyne Method, 54 Duke L.J. 1553 (2005).
66. William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. R EV.
107 (1982), reprinted in VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2.
67. Id.
68. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
69.
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of
the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that
effect might be enforced. The statute . . . punishes conspiracies to obstruct
as well as actual obstruction. If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,)
its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive
no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.
Id. at 52.
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eye. Despite the seeming toughness of a standard that required that
the “danger” be both “clear” and “present,” Holmes in the same
opinion talked of how things that could be said during times of peace
could not be said during war, and he applied his test quite casually in
sending Schenck to the clink.70 The bad tendency test, under which
the mere tendency of speech to cause harm justified its regulation, got
worse in Debs v. United States71 and Frohwerk v. United States.72 As
applied by the early Holmes, “clear and present danger” meant
neither “clear” nor “present”; all that was required to support a
conviction for seditious speech was proof of the speaker’s bad intent
and evidence of the speech’s bad tendency.
2. Clear and Present Danger. Holmes had a conversion
experience in Abrams v. United States,73 in which he wrote one of the
most eloquent dissents in the history of the Court, setting forth his
elegant defense of the marketplace of ideas.74 The rhetoric in Holmes’
Abrams dissent soared like roaring opera, thundering that “we should
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
70.

Id. at 52–53.

71. See 249 U.S. 211, 214–15 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (upholding a conviction against a speaker
who engaged in core political speech in opposition to a war).
72. 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (Holmes, J.). In Frohwerk, perhaps the least well-known of these
Holmes cases, the Supreme Court dealt with prosecutions arising from a series of articles critical
of the war effort in a German language newspaper in Missouri with a minuscule circulation,
Staats Zeitung . The articles declared it a monumental and inexcusable mistake to send
American soldiers to France, and touted the undiminished strength and unconquerable spirit of
the German people. After describing the plight of the draftee, one article asked rhetorically,
who would pronounce the draftee guilty for following “the first impulse of nature: selfpreservation.” Id. at 208. Frohwerk was convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 and
sentenced to a fine and ten years’ imprisonment. Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous
Court, affirmed the conviction. Holmes noted that Frohwerk’s articles actually had condemned
violence, deploring draft riots in Oklahoma and elsewhere. But the language Frohwerk used,
Holmes insisted, “might be taken to convey an innuendo of a different sort .” Id. at 207. The
First Amendment, Holmes noted, could not have been “intended to give immunity for every
possible use of language.” Id. at 206. He then reiterated the holding in Schenck that a person
may be convicted for conspiracy to obstruct the draft “by words of persuasion.” Id. Holmes
conceded that “[w]e do not lose our right to condemn either measures or men because the
Country is at war.” Id. at 208. Holmes then went on, however, to affirm Frohwerk’s conviction
by claiming that “on [the] record it is impossible to say that it might not have been found that
the circulation of the paper was in qua rters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a
flame and that the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out.” Id. at 209.
73. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
74. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J, dissenting).
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and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required
to save the country.”75 Brandeis would later elaborate, in his
wonderful opinion in Whitney v. California,76 admonishing that the
“fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”77 As Professor Van
Alstyne so cogently explained, the bad tendency test was far less
protective of freedom of speech than a conscientiously applied “clear
and present danger” test.78 Under “clear and present danger,” the
harm must be real, not speculative, and it must be immediate. “Bad
tendency,” however, does not speak to the gravity or clarity of the
harm, and requires no immediacy at all, merely the potential that the
speech would tend to cause harm, at some vague ly defined future
time.79
3. The Hand / Dennis Test. The First Amendment test
suggested by Judge Learned Hand and adopted by the Supreme
Court in Dennis v. United States80 directs courts “in each case” to
engage in an algebraic measure, computing whether “the gravity of
the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”81 On the plus side of
the ledger, the Hand test calls for the calculation to be made by the
judiciary, and to be made in each case. The ostensible objectivity of
the exercise, its reducibility to a chalkboard equation, and the fact
that it can be universally applied to virtually any free speech problem
also contribute to its threshold seductiveness.
If the Hand / Dennis test has the aesthetic appeal of well-defined
math, however, it is not well-calculated to protect “the freedom of
speech.” When the harm the government seeks to redress is deemed
relatively trivial—a simple fleeting trespass, for example—the Hand
test calls for a high degree of probable harm before speech may be
abridged. The difficulty, however, is that when the articulated harm is
catastrophic, speech may be abridged on virtually no showing of
75. Id.
76. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
77. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
78. See V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 35 (describing Holmes’ test to be just as protective
as the modern test).
79. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (holding that speech likely to cause
harm is unprotected when the speaker intends the harm).
80. 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
81. Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand,
J.)).
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probability at all.82 If one articulates the harm as the violent
overthrow of the United States government (the claimed harm in
Dennis itself, which involved Communist Party prosecutions) or
nuclear holocaust (such as in the infamous Progressive H-Bomb
case83 ), even speech with no realistic chance of ripening into actual
disaster may be punished. In the dark light of the terrorist attacks of
September 11 and the ongoing ripples of violence that have emanated
throughout the world in its aftermath, society might be tempted to
treat any inflammatory rhetoric (such as describing America as the
“great Satan” and urging the propriety of Jihad) as triggering
calamitous possibilities, and by that measure punish it.
4. The Brandenburg Incitement Test. The “clear and present
danger” test was reconstituted in Brandenburg v. Ohio,84 in which the
Court announced the currently-governing standard:
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.85
5. Categorical Approaches and Thoughts on the Limits of
Formulas. Casting a long shadow over all of these tests is an approach
to First Amendment law that is not geared to probabilities or harms
at all, but rather employs a very different methodology. Speech might
be subdivided into various categories which might then be ranked
according to their value or importance, perhaps arranged in
concentric circles with the most important speech at the core and the
less important speech at the periphery. First Amendment protection
would be strongest at the center and weakest at the perimeter.86

82. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 30 (“The greater the evil, the less probable need be
its occurrence to forbid speech . . . .”).
83. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 997 (W.D. Wis. 1974)
(upholding prior restraint against the publication of a magazine article explaining how a spy or
terrorist could use information in the public domain to gather the scientific information (but not
the fissionable material) needed to manufacture a nuclear bomb).
84. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
85. Id. at 447.
86. Professor Van Alstyne presents such a model (as food for discussion) in his graphic
review of free speech jurisprudence. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 42.
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At times the Supreme Court has embraced this methodology,
and it is worthy of deep critique. Let me take as my text the pivotal
passage in the Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,87 a case that Professor Van Alstyne has also used as a
foil.88 Chaplinsky is a case that predates the elevation of the Holmes /
Brandeis / Brandenburg formulation. I believe, however, that it
continues to exert a powerful gravitational pull on First Amendment
jurisprudence, a pull in opposition to the instincts of Professor Van
Alstyne and at least one of his pupils (me). Chaplinsky had echoes of
common-law Blackstone but actually went far beyond Blackstone in
suggesting a comprehensive approach to freedom of speech, namely,
that the law ought not protect speech inimical to the social interests in
order and morality:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.89

The passage opens with remarkable boldness: “There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.”90 For those who would later wish to make
Chaplinsky out to be a case that advances the cause of freedom of
speech, only the first eleven words of this sentence matter. First
Amendment civil liberties lawyers and la wyers representing large
mass media companies still cite Chaplinsky with approval in briefs,
and Supreme Court Justices who are generally sympathetic to
expansive protection for freedom of speech also still cite Chaplinsky

87.
88.
89.
90.

315 U.S. 568 (1942).
V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 26 & n.21.
Chaplinsky , 315 U.S. at 571–72.
Id. at 571.
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in their opinions.91 When they cite the case, however, they mean to
invoke only these first eleven words, pressing them for the
proposition that the regulation of expression in America is limited to
the proscription of “certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech.”92 With this limiting spin, Chaplinsky can be made out to
be a pro-free speech opinion, drawing the constitutional line in the
sand around speech falling within the “well-defined and narrowly
limited classes.”93
But this accounting is not a credible one. The remainder of the
first sentence itself gives the game away, expanding the thought with
the intrepid declaration that these classes of speech have “never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”94 Never been thought to
raise any problem! Never would seem to lay straight what historians
have found crooked, seemingly returning to Blackstone and the
original understandings of the Framers. Any means “any”—so that
the proscription of these classes does not trigger any need to balance
competing interests, or satisfy some doctrinal standard requiring
harm or intent or causal proximity. If the first sentence of the
Chaplinsky passage is to be taken seriously , it seems to mean that
speech falling within these categories—“the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous”95 —will receive no constitutional protection at
all.
Consider next the second fascinating passage in Chaplinsky—the
second half of the second sentence. Also among the proscribable
categories are the “insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.”96 This sentence fragment is often referred to as
enunciating the “fighting words” doctrine, and that is fair enough.97
But note that the Court speaks of “insulting” words as well as

91. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (O’Connor, J.) (citing , with approval,
Chaplinksy ); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996)
(Breyer, J.) (citing , with approval, Chaplinsky ).
92. Chaplinsky , 315 U.S. at 571.
93. Id.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (describing with approval Chaplinsky’s “fighting words”
doctrine); Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138, 1141 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (describing, with approval, Chaplinsky’s “fighting
words” doctrine).
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“fighting ” words. They are not the same. An insult is an affront to
human dignity. An insult works its harm through non-physical
offense. The insult is complete and the affront accrues when the
words themselves are uttered. No fisticuffs or palpable violence need
follow. “Fighting words” are a bit different. Fighting words are a kind
of super-insult, words that tend to provoke physical consequences—a
punch in the nose or a riot. The passage confirms this dichotomy. As
the Court elaborates, “insulting” words and “fighting ” words are
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury,” (the insulting
words) “or” (the “or” being quite critical here), those which “tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace” (the fighting words). Thus
the Court in this sentence means to describe two quite different kinds
of speech that may cause harms—speech that harms because it
offends or insults, and speech that harms because it incites or
provokes. The Court refers to these in the disjunctive, using “or” and
not “and,” thus clearly demarking these two harms as alternative and
equally viable bases for preventing or punishing speech.
In the third sentence the Chaplinsky Court waxes philosophical.
In an extraordinarily efficient single sentence, the doctrinal
exposition in the first two sentences is infused with its animating
theory: “It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”98 This is the most perfect articulation ever of the balancing
test that lies at the heart of all those who believe that, in the end,
freedom of speech must always be measured against other vital
societal interests in order and morality, and, additionally, that this
balance is value laden, with high value speech getting the better of the
balance than low value speech. As with the sentences preceding it,
this sentence is meaning-packed. “[S]uch utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas . . . .”99 The Court does not say they
play no part, but no essential part. Thus one need not say “Fuck the
draft” in order to express the idea “oppose the draft.” One need not
burn a flag to express the idea of dissent from the war effort.
Reinforcing this theme, the passage speaks of exposition, connoting
the use of language, reason, argument—an intellectual enterprise,

98.
99.

Chaplinsky , 315 U.S. at 572.
Id. (emphasis added).
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something more than burning a piece of cloth. Most profoundly, the
passage articulates with pristine clarity the theory driving the balance
struck: such speech is “of slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.”100 This is decidedly not the stuff
of the marketplace of ideas, for Chaplinsky does not leave the test of
truth to the power of the idea to command the market. Chaplinsky
itself contemplates that the test of truth has already been
administered, and these forms of speech have flunked the test, have
been certified already as truth retarded, as of only “slight social value
as a step to truth,” and, perhaps most importantly, have already been
deemed unfit for decent society, as “outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.” And, once again, note that Chaplinksy is not
just about keeping order—it is about keeping morality as well.
Chaplinsky is not limited to the speech that might breach the peace; it
extends to speech that offends society’s moral sensibilities.
Read generously, this authentic Chaplinsky might be best
understood as not intended to be entirely category-bound at all. It
might be read as articulating a sweeping theory, a balancing test in
which government has the freedom to pass on the social value and
truth-utility of speech and weigh those variables against morality and
good order. The various categories listed at the beginning of the
passage might be understood as merely evocative, not exhaustive.
Thus the examples on the list would automatically qualify as
categories of speech that might be punished without any
constitutional problem, but new categories of constitutionally
proscribable speech could also emerge. Alternatively, even if
Chaplinksy is read as inviting a mechanical approach to all First
Amendment problems, creating a “list” of taboo categories that come
certified as not worth the candle, and freezing First Amendment law
to the pa rticular classes contained in the list, at least one of the
categories, describing those words which “by their very utterance
inflict injury,” is dangerously amorphous. The phrase does not define
what is meant by “injury” and might open the door to punishment of
any speech that has the capacity to offend or cause listeners mental or
emotional distress.
Strictly as a descriptive matter, much of modern First
Amendment law has passed by Chaplinsky. On the surface, its

100.

Id.
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seemingly simplistic “categorical” approach to addressing First
Amendment problems would seem washed away, an observation that
Professor Van Alstyne has also made.101 Sexually explicit material
that might fairly be described as “lewd and obscene” now receives
substantial First Amendment protection, with the degree of
protection depending on the circumstances and method of
regulation;102 speech that is merely “profane” in the sense of being
vulgar or blasphemous is now recognized as entirely protected;103
speech that is “libelous” now benefits from vast First Amendment
protection, particularly when it involves public officials or public
figure plaintiffs on issues of public concern;104 and the “fighting
words” doctrine, although still alive, has been significantly honed and
narrowed by being honed and harmonized with the highly protective
intent and immediacy standards emanating from cases such as
Brandenburg v. Ohio.105
But I do not believe Chaplinsky is dead, much as I might come to
bury it. Fast-forward to a recent Supreme Court decision that again
confronted the social interests in order and morality, and the
antagonistic gravitational pulls of Chaplinsky and the Holmes /
Brandeis / Brandenburg approach to defining “the freedom of
speech” are again apparent. The case, Virginia v. Black,106 involved a
challenge to a Virginia statute that first made it a crime to burn a
cross with the intent of intimidating any person, and then treated the
burning of a cross itself as prima facie evidence of such intent.107 If, in

101. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 26 & n.21.
102. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (“[T]he CDA[’s] . . . burden on adult
speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving
the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
568 (1969) (protecting the private possession of obscene material in the home).
103. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (holding that vulgar
speech about a public figure that causes emotional distress may not be restricted); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971) (declaring that “verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance” are necessary consequences of open debate, and suggesting that, often, “one man’s
vulgarity is another’s lyric”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952) (rejecting
a state’s attempt to ban films that a censor has determined to be “sacrilegious”).
104. Cf. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 57 (holding that the publisher of an ad parody
depicting Jerry Falwell in an “outrageous” manner is not liable for damages resulting from
emotional distress).
105. 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (rejecting the application of the
“fighting words” doctrine because ne ither intent nor actual provocation were shown).
106. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). In the interest of full disclosure, the author was Counsel for the
Respondents in this case.
107. V A. CODE ANN. § 18.2–423 (Michie 1996):
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light of the horrific legacy of violence of the Ku Klux Klan, one treats
a burning cross as always being a “code” for a terrorist threat, which
was the argument advanced by the Commonwealth of Virginia,108
then one might treat it as easily embraced by even the narrower
understandings of Chaplinksy. Indeed, a “threat” is arguably an easier
First Amendment case than “fighting words,” in that the harm that
flows from a threat flows immediately —the “evil” need never be
discounted by any probability (as Learned Hand might require) or
measured by any yardstick of “clear and present danger” (as Holmes
and Brandeis might require) because the evil is fully consummated
and complete once the threat itself is made. One need only determine
if the “threat” is genuine or merely hyperbolic—in the styled parlance
of First Amendment art, whether it is a “true threat.” This
Chaplinsky-style definitional exercise (not unlike the exercise used to
determine whether speech is or is not “obscene,” as Professor Van
Alstyne might observe109 ) hearkens to cases such as Watts v. United
States110 and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.111
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of
another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision
of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a
person or group of persons.
108. See Black, 538 U.S. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I wholeheartedly agree with the
observation made by the Commonwealth of Virginia that: ‘A white, conservative, middle-class
Protestant, waking up at night to find a burning cross outside his home, will reasonably
understand that someone is threatening him.’” (quoting Brief of Petitioner)).
109. See V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 26 & n.18 (noting the categorical treatment of
obscenity by the Supreme Court).
110. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). The defendant Watts was convicted of willfully
making a threat to take the life of the president during a public rally at the Washington
Monument. Id. at 705–06. In the course of expressing his opposition to the draft, Watts stated
that “I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my
physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I
want to get in my sights is L. B. J.” Id. at 706. The Court summarily reversed Watts’ conviction,
holding that the statement, taken in context, was “a kind of very crude offensive method of
stating a political opposition to the President” and was protected by the First Amendment. Id.
at 708 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). In Claiborne Hardware, the Supreme Court applied Brandenburg
principles to overturn a conviction arising from a civil rights boycott of merchants in Mississippi.
Id. at 928–29. The tactics of the boycott organizers were found by the Mississippi Supreme
Court to include threats, intimidation, and coercion. Id. at 894. The Supreme Court, however,
held that the actions of the boycott organizers were protected by the First Amendment. Id. at
911–12:
In sum, the boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity. The
established elements of speech, assembly, association, and petition, “though not
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The Supreme Court, in a splintered decision, struck down the
Virginia law as applied to a Ku Klux Klan rally conducted on a
private farm, emphasizing the unconstitutionality of the provision in
the law that treated the mere burning of a cross as “prima facie ”
evidence of an intent to intimidate, but held that a law with this prima
facie evidence provision severed would be constitutional.112 Having
written much about the case elsewhere, my purpose here is not to
deconstruct the result or rationale , but merely to point out how the
ghosts of Chaplinsky continue to haunt the woods.
D. Summing up Van Alstyne’s Insights Regarding “The Freedom of
Speech”
As Professor Van Alstyne has persuasively argued, even a
standard as promising as the Brandenburg incitement test is still
“dramatically incomplete.”113 The difficulty posed is that even under
the Holmes / Brandeis / Brandenburg approach, the legislature
remains free to accomplish through two steps what it was forbidden
to do in one.114 The test fails to impose any freestanding First
Amendment threshold of seriousness to the “lawless action.” No one,
for example, would doubt that the legislature could make it a crime to
engage in terrorism, outlawing violent attacks on people and
property. The First Amendment, however, would normally act as a
bar to any attempt to impose liability for the mere abstract advocacy
of the propriety of making war on the United States. What Professor
Van Alstyne points out, however, is that the legislature, if it has a free
hand in defining what constitutes “lawless action,” could define the
brandishing of a defined symbol with a defined intent (such as a
burning cross with intent to intimidate) as presumptively “lawless
identical, are inseparable.” Through exercise of these First Amendment rights,
petitioners sought to bring about political, social, and economic change. Through
speech, assembly, and petition—rather than through riot or revolution—petitioners
sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them as second-class
citizens.
(internal citation omitted). More importantly, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt to impose
liability on civil rights leader Charles Evers for highly charged statements made by Evers in the
course of a speech exhorting others to part icipate in the boycott, stating that “[t]o the extent
that Evers caused respondents to suffer business losses through his organization of the boycott,
his emotional and persuasive appeals for unity in the joint effort, or his ‘threats’ of vilification or
social ostracism, Evers’ conduct is constitutionally protected and beyond the reach of a damages
award.” Id. at 926.
112. Black, 538 U.S. at 362–68.
113. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 36.
114. Id.

012306 07_SMOLLA .DOC

2005]

FIRST AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION

2/6/2006 10:21 AM

1647

action.”115 This would obviate the necessity of establishing a
connection in time or probability between the expressive action and
future lawless action, because the burning of the cross itself becomes
lawless action.116 Although the ultimate disaster (the destruction of
the nation by terrorists) might be remote, small incremental steps
working toward that end might be quite immediate, and the
legislature might, through passage of sweeping measures (as some
might label the Patriot Act, for example), make dramatic incursions
on First Amendment rights by using two steps to make a jump it
could not make in one.
This analysis suggests, just as Professor Van Alstyne’s insights
suggest, that even formulations as elegant as “clear and present
danger” require doctrinal refinements and case-by-case attention, if
they are to be worthy of the strain of “near-absolutism” suggested by
the unequivocal command of the text to “make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech . . . .”117
This is a constitutional work-in-progress. It is an experiment, as
Holmes would say, “as all life is an experiment.”118 We may all be
thankful that William Van Alstyne has been a robust player in that
experiment. The clarity of his thought and persuasiveness of his
arguments have helped keep the enterprise on track. The core
content of the First Amendment, the meaning of “the freedom of
speech,” would be far weaker without his efforts.

115. See V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 36 (recognizing that a legislature might simply
make additions to the categories of evils properly proscribed, and thereby restrict formerly
permissible speech).
116. The notion that such a two-step process might at times be constitutionally permissible is
essentially the view expressed by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Virginia v. Black. See 538 U.S.
at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting):
In my view, whatever expressive value cross burning has, the legislature simply wrote
it out by banning only intimidating conduct undertaken by a particular means. A
conclusion that the statute prohibiting cross burning with intent to intimidate sweeps
beyond a prohibition on certain conduct into the zone of expression overlooks not
only the words of the statute but also reality.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
118. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”).
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II. FREE SPEECH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
GOVERNMENT AS A PUTATIVE PARTICIPANT
A. Rights v. Privileges
Among the things that “the freedom of speech” would come to
mean in modern times is that government must not only avoid
outright regulatory “abridgments” of speech but must also justify
limitations on speech accomplished through the attachment of
conditions on government largess. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is
once again an early foil, and Professor William Van Alstyne is the
theorist largely responsible for foiling him.
Holmes was an early architect of the “right-privilege” distinction,
a glib constitutional doctrine that posited that government could
place wha tever conditions it wished on the receipt of public benefits,
even if it otherwise would have lacked the power to impose the same
prohibition as a naked restraint. In Commonwealth v. Davis,119 for
example, Holmes sustained an ordinance that prohibited public
speaking in a municipal park without a permit from the mayor.
Holmes treated the city as a landlord with the power to exclude
anyone from the park altogether. The greater power to exclude
necessarily included the lesser power to admit with conditions
attached.120 Justice Holmes, then on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, held that “[f]or the legislature absolutely or
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is
no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than
for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”121 Similarly,
when a police officer was fired for talking politics while on duty,
Holmes dismissed the officer’s First Amendment challenge with the
blunt quip: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”122
There is no American legal thinker who deserves more credit for
discrediting the Holmes right-privilege distinction than Professor Van
Alstyne, who set the course in his powerful and influential piece, The

119.
120.
121.
122.

39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d sub nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
Id. at 113.
Id.
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.).
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Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law.123 The
article, which traversed territory far broader than speech issues,
supplied a much-needed theoretical justification for limitations on the
conditions that government may properly place on the receipt of
public goods,124 and First Amendment law has benefited ever since.
The Supreme Court has on many occasions rejected the rightprivilege distinction.125 Many Supreme Court Justices, writing in
concurrence126 or dissent,127 have drawn on Professor Van Alstyne’s

123. See Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21; see also Richard A.
Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. R EV. 4 (1988); Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of
the New Property , 31 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 295 (1990); Charles A. Reich, The New Property , 73
Y ALE L.J. 733 (1964); Rodney A. Smolla, Preserving the Bill of Rights in the Modern
Administrative-Industrial State, 31 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 321 (1990); Rodney A. Smolla, The
Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting
Too Much, 35 STAN. L. R EV. 69 (1982) [hereinafter Smolla, Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction]; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. R EV. 1415 (1989);
Van Alstyne, New Property, supra note 21.
124. See Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21, at 1459–62 (attacking
Holmes’s reasoning and the assumptions on which the right-privilege distinction is based).
125. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547–49 (2001) (conditions
placed on practices of lawyers funded through legal aid funds violated First Amendment); Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372–73 (1976) (holding political patronage system unconstitutional);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that public
school students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate”).
126. See O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 795–96 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring):
To state a general rule, however, is not to decide a specific case. The Court never has
held that any substantive restriction upon removal of any governmental benefit gives
rise to a generalized property interest in its continued enjoyment. Indeed, a majority
of the Justices of this Court are already on record as concluding that the term
‘property’ sometimes incorporates limiting characterizations of statutorily bestowed
interests. Common sense and sound policy support this recognition of some measure
of flexibility in defining ‘new property’ expectancies. Public benefits are not held in
fee simple.
(citations omitted) (citing Van Alstyne, New Property , supra note 21, at 460–66); McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 633 & n.6 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing Sherbert v. Verner as
resting on the fact that the state had forced the claimant “‘to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand,’” and stating that “Sherbert
did not state a new principle in this regard” (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963) (citing Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21)); Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S.
59, 65 & n.14 (1971) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring):
It is apparent that this disparate treatment has the effect of classifying appellants
according to wealth, which, like race, is a suspect classification. Accordingly, this
classification could withstand challenge only upon a showing of compelling
circumstances. Respondent offers none but simply repeats the discredited maxim that
paupers’ appeals are privileges, not rights.
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scholarship to reinforce the demise of the right-privilege distinction,
or either to extol or lament its seeming reappearance.
The approach that has emerged forces the government, when
confronted with the claim that it has placed impermissible restrictions
on the receipt of largess, to justify the restrictions in neutral terms
related to the mission of the program. The justification is analyzed
under various balancing tests that, although not as speech-protective
as those tests that apply when government seeks to regulate spe ech in
the general marketplace, nonetheless provide the speaker with
sufficiently hardy legal doctrine to make the contest a fair fight.128
When the restriction instead is exposed as an effort to skew the
marketplace of ideas by using government funding to engage in
viewpoint discrimination, the restriction is unconstitutional.129
This is our working constitutional divide, and we have the work
of William Van Alstyne to thank for helping us to intelligently chart
it. Yet constitutional divides, like continental divides, are at times
jagged and uneven, and it is easy to fall off or lose sight of the path. It
is worth sampling a few of the critical doctrinal battlegrounds, such as
public forum law and the law governing the speech of government
employees, to get a sense of the struggle.

(citations omitted) (citing Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21).
127. See Peer v. Griffeth, 445 U.S. 970, 970 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari) (“There has been much decisional law from this and other courts, and much
scholarly commentary , as to what is a protected ‘property’ interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and what procedural guarantees are necessary under that
Clause before one may be denied such a property interest.” (citing Van Alstyne, New Property,
supra note 21)); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 583 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is
said that since teaching in a public school is a privilege, the State can grant it or withhold it on
conditions. We have, however, rejected that thesis in numerous cases.” (citing Van Alstyne,
Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21)); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 493 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (“[W]e have long discarded the right-privilege distinction.”
(citing Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21)); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 520 & n.14 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In my view, equal protection analysis of
this case is not appreciably advanced by the a priori definition of a ‘right,’ fundamental or
otherwise.” (citing Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21)).
128. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text (describing limitations to contentdiscrimination by the government when funding expression).
129. A somewhat old but hauntingly au courant synopsis is that of Homer v. Richmond, 292
F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir.
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B. Public Forum Law
Public forum law is a highly stylized and easy-to-parody body of
law through which the Supreme Court seeks to divide those
government programs and spaces into two forms. Some programs and
spaces are truly “public” in a free speech sense and presumptively
open to indiscriminate exercise of freedom of expression and thus
heavily protected from regulation based on content or viewpoint.
Other programs and spaces are those that exist primarily to advance
some governmental business, and thus subject to balancing tests
supplying more the more moderated quantum of protection attendant
to “intermediate scrutiny ” levels of judicial review. Despite its
stylistic density and concomitant vulnerability to ridicule, as a rough
functional divide public forum law is both a potent antidote to the
right-privilege distinction of Justice Holmes and a reasonably
serviceable workhorse First Amendment doctrine.
Public forum law begins with a robust rejection of the Holmes
view in Commonwealth v. Davis,130 the view that the government may
exclude speakers from public spaces with the same cavalier whimsy
with which a curmudgeonly landlord might exclude a visitor from
private property. Certain public spaces—streets, sidewalks, parks131 —
are deemed “traditional public fora,” places that have a kind of “free
speech easement” that runs with them and are subject only to those
restrictions on the content or viewpoint of expression that are banned
virtually per se.132 Yet these spaces can also be subject to restrictions
on the mere “time, place, or manner” of the speech that are subject to
an intermediate-scrutiny balancing test that tests the significance of
the government’s rationale for regulation, the tailoring of the
regulatory effort, and the availability of alternative channels of

130. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
131. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (“‘[P]ublic places’ historically
associated with the free exercise of expre ssive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks,
are considered, without more, to be ‘public forums.’ In such places, the government’s ability to
permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited . . . .” (citations omitted)).
132. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 329 (1988) (applying “exacting scrutiny” to a
District of Columbia law prohibiting the display of signs critical of a foreign government within
500 yards of that government’s embassy, and ruling that law facially violative of the First
Amendment); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976) (noting that access to “streets,
sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places” for the purpose of exercising First
Amendment rights “cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely”) (quoting
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 315
(1976)).
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communication.133 The strength of the doctrine here is that the
traditional public forum is open to speech whether the government
desires this result or not. The Supreme Court has thus held that
“traditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of
the government’s intent. The objective characteristics of these
properties require the government to accommodate private
speakers.”134
Once outside “traditional public fora,” modern public forum law
gets more complicated, and correspondingly less theoretically and
doctrinally pure, but it is defensible nonetheless. Through a kind of
“adverse possession,” government property and programs that are
not traditionally open to expression may become so-called
“designated public fora” when the government treats the space (a
municipal theater, for example135 ) as a space open to a wide range of
expression.136 Then there are nonpublic fora, spaces that are deemed
functional but not dedicated to expression,137 and the curious hybrid
known as the “limited public forum,” open to expressive activity but
limited to certain subject matter or patrons.138 At the margins the
application of this body of law may be difficult, with courts reaching

133. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989):
[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative cha nnels for communication of the information.”
(quoting Clark v. Comm. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
134. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998).
135. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (holding the
denial of an application to perform at a municipal theater to be a prior restraint on the use of a
public forum).
136. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)
(“[W]hen the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a
public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental interest.”).
137. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730, 737 (1990) (holding that a sidewalk in
front of a post office was not a public forum).
138. A university, for example, might open classrooms or funding programs to student
groups and be forbidden from discriminating on the basis of content or viewpoint among those
groups. See Rosenbe rger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995)
(holding that a university policy of denying funding to any student group that “primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality” infringes
the right to free speech (alteration in original) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at
66a)); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (striking down content-based discrimination
by a university in its classroom use policies).
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conflicting results on essentially equivalent facts.139 But on the whole,
the use of context to divide government property into public and
private spaces, with a generally generous willingness to classify spaces
public and provide a healthy measure of protection when they are so
classified, represents a laudable advance in First Amendment
doctrine.
C. The Speech of Public Employees
A similar analytic divide has emerged in public employee speech
cases. Once again, the harsh regime of the Holmes right-privilege
distinction has been mitigated by doctrines that now supply public
employees with a healthy measure of First Amendment protection.
Thus the aphorism of the political spoils system that “to the
victor belong the spoils” has been repudiated by a line of cases
generally forbidding the wholesale firing of government employees
because they are affiliated with the wrong political party.140 The
doctrine is mitigated in part by an exception that permits patronage in
certain positions. The positions that qualify for the exception are
usually high in the hierarchy of government and involve substantial
policymaking authority or special solicitude for confidences. For such
positions, party affiliation is deemed appropriate, and requiring such
affiliation does not offend the First Amendment.141 “To the victor
belong the spoils” has thus been supplanted by “To the victor belong
only those spoils that may be constitutionally obtained.”142 Again, the
doctrinal contours here are imperfect; one might well hope for
brighter lines and greater definitional rigor in the articulation of the
exception to the rule, but in its broad sweep the rule itself is
beneficent, working to eliminate the application of the right-privilege
139. Compare Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 v. City of N.Y. Dep’t
of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 552 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaza space at the
Lincoln Center performing arts complex between West 62nd and West 65th Streets in
Manhattan was not a traditional public forum), with First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that a portion of a street in the downtown
Salt Lake City mall area, sold by the city to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, but
over which the city retained an easement, was a traditional public forum).
140. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (holding that “the practice of
patronage dismissals is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments”).
141. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (“[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether
the label ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether
the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the
effective performance of the public office involved.”).
142. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 64 (1990).
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distinction in gross as applied to the vast majority of government
employees.
So too, a public employee fired or disciplined for speaking may
now challenge the adverse action on First Amendment grounds. The
court will first ask whether the employee’s speech was on a “matter of
public concern.”143 If this question is answered affirmatively, the
employee has a foot in the door; the court will then proceed to apply
a balancing test, in which the interest of the employee to speak is
balanced against the interest of the government as employer in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs as an
employer.144 In Connick v. Myers, the link to the repudiated rightprivilege distinction was made explicit; the Court openly
acknowledged that “[f]or most of this century, the uncha llenged
dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to
conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those
which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”145 After
recognizing the persistence of the right-privilege distinction, the
Court openly rejected it as a legitimate basis for analysis.146 The Court
instead installed its balancing test, now applied routinely by lower
courts,147 which focuses on such factors as whether the contested
speech was disruptive,148 insubordinate,149 or corrosive of esprit de
corps150 .

143. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (“To be protected, the [employee’s]
speech must be on a matter of public concern . . . .”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48
(1983) (declaring that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement”); Pickering v. Bd.
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968) (“[T]he question whether a school system requires additional
funds is a matter of legitimate public concern . . . .”).
144. Waters, 511 U.S. at 668; Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 146; Pickering , 391 U.S. at 568.
145. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.
146. Id. at 144.
147. See, e.g., Gust afason v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2002) (setting forth a detailed,
multi-step balancing test for application to the Connick line of cases).
148. See Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 372 (7th Cir. 2000) (determining that a sensational
news release by a firefighter, accusing his chief of preferential treatment toward homosexuals,
would disrupt the department’s operations).
149. See Havekost v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 925 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1991)
(asserting that circulation of a petition calling for the discharge of a person higher in the chain
of duties was not speech on matters of public concern but merely an expression of a private
workplace preference); Withiam v. Baptist Health Care, 98 F.3d 581, 583 (10th Cir. 1996)
(expression of personal grievance not protected speech on matters of public concern).
150. See INS v. FLRA, 855 F.2d 1454, 1464, 1466 (9th Cir. 1988) (government as employer
may punish employee speech that is corrosive of esprit de corps).
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This framework was reinforced by the holding in Rankin v.
McPherson,151 in which the Supreme Court held that an
administrative employee in a Texas constable’s office could not be
fired when she blurted out, upon hearing the breaking news that John
Hinckley had shot President Ronald Reagan, that “if they go for him
again, I hope they get him.”152 The statement, made to a co-employee
who was also her boyfriend, arose in the context of an intense
conversation ranging over issues relating to poverty, race, and
President Reagan’s social policies.153 The government’s view that it
had the right to fire McPherson was not entirely makeweight;
certainly one might demand of law enforcement employees a
sufficient respect for law and order that they refrain from openly
advocating the desirability of presidential assassination as an
instrument of social change. The Supreme Court, however, felt it
incumbent to be sensitive both to the plainly hyperbolic character of
McPherson’s remarks—she was merely blowing off steam to her
boyfriend in response to emotionally charged news about a leader she
apparently despised—and to her role within the hierarchy of the
public agency involved.154 The Court thus noted that it could not
“believe that every employee in Constable Rankin’s office, whether
computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is equally required, on
pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of being
interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may
be unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency.”155
The Connick / Pickering / Wa ters framework, like public forum
analysis, can be picked at if one is so inclined.156 The “matters of
public concern” test is highly vulnerable at times, for reasons that
may parallel certain vulnerabilities in public forum law. There is an
inherent tension in the notion of “matters of public concern” as
applied to government employees. Because, in the largest sense, all of
what goes on inside a government agency may be of concern to the
public, when an employee criticizes agency policy or the actions of a
151. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
152. Id. at 381.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 389–91.
155. Id. at 391.
156. See Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 75 (1988) (citing courts’ “unbridled discretion” in
determining “matters of public concern” as the cause of inconsistencies among lower court
interpretations of Connick).
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superior, the employee is arguably speaking on matters of public
concern. Yet not all complaining employees are righteous
whistleblowers; the government acting as employer is carrying on the
work of a sovereign yet in many senses is using employees in much
the same manner as any employer. This conundrum is difficult and, as
with any legal test that attempts to reconcile such competing tensions,
naturally generates a fair number of reported case decisions.157 Yet as
with public forum law, there is logic to taking a middle ground, and
with any middle ground there will be litigation as parties—who view
the precise placement of the line in any given case through their own
prisms of experience—contest which side of the middle they fall. The
logic of the middle ground is that solicitude for free speech values
ought to be at its apex when society seeks to facilitate the free
exchange of information and ideas as part of discourse in the public
arena. This animating value applies with diminished force, however,
when speech is merely the vehicle through which the routine
intramural frictions of the workplace are resolved.158 An all-ornothing solution in either direction would be untenable. To return to
the regime of Holmes and the right-privilege distinction, as Professor
Van Alstyne so cogently explained, would permit government to
engage in action inimical to constitutional values through the mere
artifice of labeling.159 At the same time, however, the government has
interests that it may invoke in certain functional contexts—as when
the government is trying to manage property used to deliver the mail
or run an agency with hundreds or thousands of employees organized
in a complex hierarchy —that it does not have when it is merely acting
as the pandemic sovereign responsible for the rule of law in the open
marketplace. Both the public forum and public employment cases
require vigilance, for there is the constant worry that the government
157. See R ODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 18:5–
18:22 (2004) (collecting and critiquing cases applying the test).
158. See Smolla, Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 123, at 74–75:
[An] underlying element, one that is a close corollary of the fre edom of contract
notion, is the idea that government should have greater latitude in its dealings with
individuals when it acts as the proprietor of the public business rather than as the
pandemic regulator. The proprietary-regulatory distinction, by assuming that
restrictions are less necessary when government acts essentially as a private entity
administering its internal business, frees government in that context from certain
restrictions that would apply to it when it acts as a governing entity.
(footnote omitted).
159. See Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21, at 1459 (stating that the
government automatically denies constitutional protection by merely labeling expression a
privilege rather than a right).
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will cheat and attempt an illegitimate gerrymander, seeking to
commandeer more of the public arena than that to which it is entitled.
This illicit gerrymander might be spatial—as when the government
seeks to exclude speech from a public plaza on the theory that it
ought to be dedicated to quiet musings over the meanings of
sculpture; it might be spectral—as when the government seeks to
commandeer the spectrum of public debate over agency policy; or it
might involve some other spectrum—as when it exerts unique
regulatory control over the airwaves. That we must constantly watch
how government draws its lines between public and private space,
however, does not mean that the act of line -drawing is wrong in itself.
D. Academic Freedom, Government Speech, and Other Conundrums
I have set out here in some detail the manner in which the rightprivilege problem has evolved in constitutional doctrine in the
specific contexts of public forum law and the speech of public
employees. I have no doubt that the relatively sensible doctrinal
evolution in these two areas, although not without tensions and
difficulties, owes a great deal to the seminal efforts of William Van
Alstyne.
A large part of First Amendment law today is really the demise
of the right-privilege distinction working itself pure. We have William
Van Alstyne to thank for the kick-start his thinking gave to this
healthy but always contentious process. With enough space and time,
one could trace the same right-privilege problem through any number
of other problems, such as the free speech issues surrounding public
schools,160 the government funding of speech,161 academic freedom,162
or government speech.163 Professor Van Alstyne has written and
spoken extensively on all these issues. One could fill a book, for
example, commenting and reflecting on his remarkable contributions

160. See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (sustaining
the power of school authorities to discipline a student for material in a high school newspaper);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (sustaining the power of school
authorities to discipline a student for sexually suggestive remarks made at a school assembly);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (protecting a student’s
wearing of a black arm band as a passive symbol of war protest); R ODNEY A. SMOLLA , SMOLLA
AND NIMMER ON F REEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 17:1–17:20 (2004) (collecting and critiquing cases on
free speech issues in public schools).
161. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
162. See infra note 164–165 and accompanying text.
163. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
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to academic freedom in America,164 contributions reflected in his
scholarship, his efforts as a litigator, his towering national leadership
in the American Association of University Professors, and in his dayto-day commitment to academic freedom at Duke and at the many
other campuses around the nation at which he has graced faculties.165
Professor Van Alstyne ’s newest challenge is to take on the fastdeveloping issue of “government speech.”166 This effort, a work in
164. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in
the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 79 (Summer 1990); William W. Van Alstyne, Foreword to Freedom and Tenure in the
Academy: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles, 53 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (Summer 1990); William W. Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some
Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA . L. R EV. 328 (1963) [hereinafter Van Alstyne, Political
Speakers]; William W. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General
Issue of Civil Liberty , 404 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI . 140 (1972), reprinted in THE
CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 1975) [hereinafter Van
Alstyne, Specific Theory ].
165. Professor Van Alstyne’s work in the arena of academic freedom and the role of the
Constitution on campus has influenced the thinking of Justices of the Supreme Court. See
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 279 n.2 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Although these
comments were not directed at a public university’s concern with extracurricular activities, it is
clear that the ‘atmosphere’ of a university includes such a critical aspect of campus life.” (citing
Van Alstyne, Specific Theory, supra note 164, at 77–81)); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
& n.3 (1972) (noting the intersection of equal protection and First Amendment
antidiscrimination principles (citing Van Alstyne, Political Speakers, supra note 164)); Jones v.
State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 34 (1970) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
But the campus, where this leaflet was distributed, is a fitting place for the
dissemination of a wide spectrum of ideas.
Moreover, it is far too late to suggest that since attendance at a state university is a
‘privilege,’ not a ‘right,’ there are no constitutional barriers to summary withdrawal of
the ‘privilege.’
(citing Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21, at 1445–54); Note, Academic
Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARV. L. R EV. 879 (1979); Comment,
Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA . L. R EV. 144 (1968).
166. Cases in which the government is the funder of the speech, or is itself the speaker,
present one of the most rapidly developing arenas in which this process continues to unfold. See,
e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000) (upholding a
university’s use of student fees to support extracurricular speech activities by students, provided
the fees are administered with viewpoint neutrality); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 481, 484
(1987) (allowing Congress to place the term “political propaganda” upon expressive materials
from foreign countries intended to influence U.S. foreign policy); Planned Parenthood of S.C. v.
Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004) (striking down South Carolina’s “Choose Life” specialty
license plate because it only opened a limited forum to one viewpoint, thereby favoring that
viewpoint, without the State having identified itself as the speaker); Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618–21,
626 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying a four-factor test to determine that logos incorporating the
Confederate flag on specialty license plates concern private speech, not government speech, and
striking down a restriction on such logos as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination).
Government may put its resources behind one policy (pro-life) but not another (the provision of
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progress in the Spring of 2005, is being undertaken by Professor Van
Alstyne as this essay and this symposium tribute to his scholarship
were being completed. I have been lucky enough to have been given a
sneak preview of the problems that he is tackling, and, along with the
others who so admire his scholarship, I cannot wait to see what he
does with it. And so retrospective here gives way to prospective.
Perhaps there is no more apt tribute to William Van Alstyne the
teacher and scholar than the observation that we all continue to
anticipate his work.
CONCLUSION
William Van Alstyne, the greatest intellectual provocateur in my
life in the law, has through his extraordinary insights into these
conundrums cajoled and confounded my own thinking on freedom of
speech for over two decades. His ruminations and variations on the
constitutional text and history, his ringing chord changes on
approaches to constitutional interpretation, his pioneering
exploration of the distinction between “rights” and “privileges,” and
his graphic elaborations on the wide variety of approaches that courts
and commentators have invoked to try to organize and render
coherent free speech law, have been at once a wonderful guide and a
vexing challenge to anyone who has ventured into this arena.
I could go on and on exploring the pervasive influence of
William Van Alstyne’s thought on the evolution of First Amendment

information concerning abortion services), provided it does not engage in viewpoint
discrimination; government may not place restrictions on the dispensing of largess by private
speakers in a manner that discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. Government may, however,
when it is itself engaged in speech, express its own viewpoint (to the disparagement of others)
without triggering any significant First Amendment judicial review whatsoever. Compare Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–94 (1991) (asserting that “[t]he Government can, without violating
the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in
the public interest,” and that “when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a
program it is entitled to define the limits of that program”), with Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833–34 (1995) (recognizing that the Court has
“permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the
speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message,” but refusing to extend
that authority when the government “discriminate[s] based on the viewpoint of private persons
whose speech it facilitates”), and Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
at 235 (stating that “[w]hen the government speaks . . . it is . . . accountable to the electorate and
the political process for its advocacy,” but noting that the university was not speaking here). A
critical question, now being addressed by Professor Van Alstyne in his forthcoming efforts, is
whether there are limits imposed by the First Amendment on even the government’s own
expression.
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doctrine and theory, as one might for virtually any arena of
constitutional law. The reflections here only scratch the surface. As
lawyers, scholars, and citizens, we owe Professor Van Alstyne a great
deal for his courage and honesty as a teacher, scholar, leader, and
advocate.
For me, it is also more personal. The intellectual excitement and
passionate commitment with which he approached the world of
constitutional law caught fire in me on the first day of class with him.
That excitement, commitment, and passion have fired my
professional life ever since.
I will always be indebted to William Van Alstyne for that
inspiration. It is the kind of debt that the student never really repays
to the teacher, except to the extent that the student may also learn to
teach, and, in so doing, seek to inspire others. My life as a lawyer and
scholar was forever influenced by Professor Van Alstyne, and I know
of no other way to thank him than to continue to labor to pass on to
new generations of students some measure of the passion and zeal for
our wonderful Constitution that he so indelibly instilled in me.

